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I. INTRODUCTION

I

dentifying a framework for assessing the permissible geography of armed
conflict must be driven by both strategic and legal considerations. Armed
conflict by its very nature manifests the exercise of national power implicating the most fundamental aspect of sovereignty: the right and obligation
of the State to protect itself from internal or external threat.1 Categories of
armed conflict2 and their associated legal regimes evolved in response to
this reality. Up until recently, almost all threats functionally sufficient in
nature and magnitude to necessitate a full–blown military response (the use
of military force to execute combat operations, as opposed to constabulary
* Presidential Research Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law; Lieutenant
Colonel, U.S. Army (Ret.). Special thanks to my research assistant, Joel Glover, whose
devotion to accomplishing this mission undoubtedly mirrored the type of devotion he
brought to his duties as a platoon leader and a battalion effects coordinator in Iraq, and as
co–captain of Army football. The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author
and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the U.S. Naval War College,
the Department of the Navy, or Department of Defense. © 2013 by Geoffrey S. Corn.
1. Deni Elliott, Terrorism, Global Journalism and the Myth of the Nation-State, 19 JOURNAL
OF MASS MEDIA ETHICS: EXPLORING QUESTIONS OF MEDIA MORALITY 29 (2004).
2. Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 63 THE HAGUE ACADEMY COLLECTED COURSES 131 (1979).
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support operations)3 took the form of hostilities between two or more
States (characterized by international law as international armed conflicts),
and bringing into force the full corpus of the law of armed conflict
(LOAC), or internal dissident or insurgent threats involving hostilities between State forces and organized armed groups (characterized by international law as non–international armed conflicts, and bringing into force a
less comprehensive albeit substantial body of LOAC regulation). Accordingly, LOAC responded to these two “types” of armed conflicts4 with a
continual and important progression of regulatory norms applicable to
both categories.5 These norms, and the constant progression of their content and applicability, were and are intended to balance the strategic needs
of the State with the humanitarian objectives that have always animated
conflict regulation.6
It is debatable, however, whether these two categories of armed conflict were from inception underinclusive, in the sense that they failed to
account for situations of armed hostilities falling outside their scope.7 This
underinclusiveness is illustrated by U.S. military history. Examples of combat operations that would fail to fit nicely within these two dominant categories of armed conflict include the U.S. participation in the multinational
response to the 1900 Boxer Rebellion in China; the 1916 U.S. punitive raid
against Pancho Villa in Mexico; and the U.S. and Allied intervention in the
Russian Civil War (which actually resulted in a U.S. force presence on Russian soil through 1921, long after the end of World War I).8 These exam3. See Keith Robert Lovejoy, A Peacekeeping Force for Future Operations: Another Reassessment of the Constabulary Force Concept (2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr
/fulltext/u2/a414134.pdf.
4. Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1, 82–86 (2009)
(discussing the different types of armed conflict) [hereinafter Vité].
5. JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, ICRC, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule1 (last visited Aug. 9, 2012).
6. ICRC, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: BASIC KNOWLEDGE,
available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law1_final.pdf (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) and Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, 317 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 125 (1997).
7. Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL
LAW 295, 296–97 (2007) [hereinafter Corn].
8. Michael Parenti, Rulers of the Planet: Why US Leaders Intervene Everywhere, 5 GLOBAL
DIALOGUE (2003), available at http://www.worlddialogue.org/print.php?id=220.
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ples illustrate that in practice armed conflict has never been statically confined to the two “types” that became the dominant focus of conflict regulation following World War II. More important for the purposes of this essay, these two categories of armed conflict have not been the definitive
standard for assessing the geographic scope of combat operations.9
The post–World–War–II bipolar strategic environment did, however,
reinforce the binary nature of armed conflict typology—and with it the assumption that the nature of the armed conflict included an implicit geographic scope limitation. Wars were generally confined to the geography of
one or two States. Even the limited inter–State armed conflicts of the period lacked the widespread geographic range of operations that defined the
two world wars.10 Instead, as a result of the immense perceived risks associated with conflagration, most armed conflicts were generally “self–
contained” events. Nonetheless, the perceived U.S. need for global engagement capability was a primary characteristic of national security policy.
The Cold War was indeed defined by the strategic capacity to meet any
threat, in any location, in the form in which it presented itself.11 While history was kind to spare the world from the global consequence of the Cold
War turning hot, the practice of forward deployment and global engagement indicates that had this occurred, the conflict would have been worldwide.
The end of the Cold War blew the lid off of a pot that had been simmering for the entire period: the threat of international terrorism. While
during the Cold War terrorism was generally treated as a subtext to the
global bipolar struggle,12 it soon came into its own as a national security
threat. While the risk associated with international terrorism became increasingly apparent, the modality for protecting against this risk was anything but apparent. During the decade preceding September 11, 2001, this
situation manifested itself in tremendous operational uncertainty, especially
for the armed forces. Counterterrorism was viewed as one of the many potential military missions that fell into the category of “Low Intensity Con9. Department of the Navy, MCDP 1, WARFIGHTING (1997).
10. See generally MARTIN GILBERT, THE FIRST WORLD WAR: A COMPLETE HISTORY
(1994); RONALD STORY, CONCISE HISTORICAL ATLAS OF WORLD WAR II: THE GEOGRAPHY OF ARMED CONFLICT (2005).
11. See ROGER S. WHITCOMB, THE COLD WAR IN RETROSPECT: THE FORMATIVE
YEARS 182–84 (1998).
12. WAYNE C. MCWILLIAMS & HARRY PIOTROWSKI, THE WORLD SINCE 1945: A
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1 (6th ed. 2005).
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flict” or “Military Operations Other Than War.”13 U.S. military doctrine did
not, however, address the legal characterization of such missions. Consequently, military counterterrorism was generally understood as military
support to international law enforcement,14 although military action occasionally took the form of combat operations (such as the cruise missile attack against suspected al Qaeda targets in response to the African embassy
bombings).15 Whatever the legal characterization, one thing seemed increasingly clear: the scope of operations would, like virtually all other military
missions, be threat driven.
How the U.S. military response to the terrorist attacks of September 11
impacted the typology of armed conflict is arguably yesterday’s news, at
least for the United States. While certainly not an accepted theory of armed
conflict, the term “transnational armed conflict” (TAC)—indicating a non–
international armed conflict, and its accordant LOAC rules, occurring outside the territory of the responding State—has gained increasing traction in
the United States and abroad to denote an armed conflict against a non–
State threat in various global environments.16 This usage suggests a broader
recognition of the under–inclusiveness of the binary armed conflict framework. There is also no question that assertion of a hybrid category of
armed conflict—whether characterized as TAC or an internationalized
Common Article 3 armed conflict—has generated substantial consternation that is in large measure the result of the link between TAC and the
broad geographic scope of military operations it ostensibly legitimizes.17
13. See James N. Miller Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations /
Low-Intensity Conflict, available at http://policy.defense.gov (last visited Sept. 8, 2012).
14. Joint Publication 3-26, COUNTERTERRORISM, (2009), available at http://www.dtic.
mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub_operations.htm.
15. LAUREN PLOCH, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, COUNTERING TERRORISM IN EAST AFRICA: THE U.S. RESPONSE 1–2 (2010).
16. Vité, supra note 4, at 88; Corn, supra note 7; see Geoffrey S. Corn & Eric T. Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A "Principled" Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror
Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL LAW REVIEW 1, 33–34 (2009) (discussing how the continued
evolution of TAC, or the acts of “war” carried out by States that attack non-State targets
outside of their boundaries, must preserve “the fundamental balance between authority
and obligations that lies at the core of the LOAC” to preserve its legitimacy as it becomes
more common) [hereinafter Corn & Jensen].
17. Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention and Targeting Outside the 'Hot' Conflict Zone, 161 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2049532 (last visited Sept. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Daskal]; Mary Ellen O'Connell, Defining
Armed Conflict, 13 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT SECURITY LAW 393 (2008); George Monbiot, A
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The debate over conflict typology raises this question: is the TAC concept inherently invalid? Put another way, is the invocation of unrestricted
geographic scope for an armed conflict against a non–State opponent the
true focal point of objection to this typology? The latter proposition may
explain why some experts now seek to impose an implied geographic limitation on the conduct of operations within the framework of TAC—such
as an implied constraint to what some scholars have labeled “hot zones” of
military operations.18 Ultimately, however, seeking to identify and impose a
geographic restriction detached from the threat dynamics triggering the use
of combat power is a false solution to the concerns of operational overbreadth associated with TAC. Such limitation is a futile endeavor, for the
developing axiomatic reason that once a State commits to the use of force
as a remedy against such a transnational non–State threat—like all other
conflicts in history—the dynamics of the threat itself will be the predominant consideration in defining the scope of operations.
This latter premise frustrates some international law scholars. They insist that the first step in defining the geographic scope of military operations is to assess the internationally permissible geography of armed conflict. Strategy, they posit, must yield to international legal constraint.19
This is undoubtedly the “correct” ideological starting point: law imposes its own geography—the geography of permissible policy maneuver
space. Decisions related to when, where and how to use instruments of
national power are not made in a legal vacuum. Rather, domestic and international law significantly impact these decisions. Legal advisors inform policy decisions by providing the policymaker with the left and right boundaries of permissible conduct. This framework is far more complex on the
more specific issue of geography of armed conflict. Even assuming international law categorically constrains permissible strategy options (an assumption that ignores the reality that States periodically choose to violate international law in order to achieve vital national security objectives), the relevant law must be unequivocal. On the question of conflict geography,

Wilful Blindness, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 11, 2003, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk.
/world/2003/mar/11/usa.iraq.
18. Daskal, supra note 17; Ashley Deeks, “Unwilling or Unable”: Toward a Normative
Framework for Extraterritorial Self-Defense, 52 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
483 (2012) [hereinafter Deeks].
19. Michael N. Schmitt, Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law, 84 AIR
FORCE LAW REVIEW 1, 35–36 (2008).
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however, this is not the case. It involves a complex intersection of jus ad
bellum,20 neutrality21 and jus in bello principles.22
None of these sources categorically define a geographic constraint on
the execution of combat operations within the context of an ongoing non–
international armed conflict. Instead, they combine to provide a general
outline of acceptable State action, sometimes by analogy (such as the effort
to extend neutrality principles to the inapposite context of non–
international armed conflict), or sometimes more directly (such as the invocation of the principle of military necessity as a source of authority to
adopt a threat–based scope of combat operations). On the geography of
conflict question, the net outcome is anything but an unequivocal international legal standard that nullifies the validity of a ––driven scope of military operations. This is unsurprising. The entire TAC concept is an evolution of existing LOAC principles, as is the exercise of national self–defense
in response to a transnational non–State threat. Thus, international law has
yet to settle on an issue as complex as permissible geography of operations
conducted in response to the threat of international terrorism.
Seeking to identify some legally mandated geographic boundary for
armed conflict of any type is, thus, a genuine Red Herring.23 Armed conflict
is a threat–driven concept, arising when the threat necessitates resort to
combat power, and extending to wherever the operational and tactical opportunity to produce a militarily valuable effect on the enemy arises. There
are examples of States choosing not to expand the scope of conflicts simply because such an opportunity arose. However, other factors impact such
decisions, and it would be an error to equate decisions to refrain from exercising authority with an inherent legal prohibition against such exercise.
The scope of TAC—like that of any armed conflict—must be threat
driven for a reason. Admittedly, there exists a perceived and actual risk of
20. Deeks, supra note 18.
21. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT NEUTRALITY, available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law8
_final.pdf (“Belligerent States have a number of duties. They must establish a neutrality
policy ensuring respect for neutral space, in particular that armed forces involved in the
conflict do not enter neutral space and that neutral States are not affected by the collateral
effects of hostilities.”).
22. Most notably the principle of military necessity as a justification for taking the
fight to the enemy.
23. Targeting Operations with Drone Technology: Humanitarian Law Implications
(Mar. 25, 2011), available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/ipimages/Human_Rights
_Institute/BackgroundNoteASILColumbia.pdf.
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an overzealous and overbroad assertion of LOAC–based authority to attack and disable threat operatives inherent in the combined effect of TAC
as a theory of armed conflict typology and a threat–driven scope interpretation. Nonetheless, States must avoid attempts to identify or impose some
per se geographic limitations on this type of armed conflict. Any authority
overreach (invoking the power to incapacitate through an application of
LOAC principles), triggered by extending the concept of armed conflict to
transnational non–State threats, will be more effectively mitigated by focusing on the traditional dynamics of lawful wartime action and tailoring or
adjusting traditional sources of LOAC authority to meet the unique challenges of this type of armed conflict. Chief among these particular challenges are, one, ensuring that the targeting process adequately accounts for
the complexity of threat identification in this inherently unconventional
environment; and two, ensuring that preventive detention processes sufficiently address the unique scope and nature of this type of armed conflict.
Focusing on these two practical challenges will produce a better balance
between national security realities and the individual interests of potential
objects of State action than would be achieved by attempting to confine
that action to an arbitrary “hot zone.”
II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE
GLOBALIZATION OF NON–INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
It is self–evident that a principal function of any government is to protect
State interests from external and internal threats.24 To do so, leaders leverage the various components of national power, ideally in a synchronized
manner that maximizes strategic success by achieving the protective objective as efficiently as possible.25 Military power is a key tool in the national
security arsenal, often providing strategic decision makers with unique capabilities to inflict devastating blows to disrupt or disable threat capabilities.
For the United States, the ability to leverage military power effectively
is rooted in its very origins. A nation born of conflict, and unified in part
24. President Barack Obama, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lecture
_en.html.
25. See President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United
States (Sept. 2002), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss
/2002/nss3.html [hereinafter National Security Strategy].
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because of the recognized need to “perfect” our collective ability to provide for a common defense, the use of military power to secure national
security objectives has been a constant theme of our national narrative. In
this sense, the utilization of military power to contribute to the national
objective of neutralizing the capacity of international terrorism is not especially remarkable. Indeed, it seems more noteworthy that it took the devastating attacks of September 11 for national leaders to become overt and
unapologetic about this utilization, even though it is well established that
such use was ongoing prior to that date.26
No single national security policy shift in recent memory has produced
more legal controversy than the overt, robust and ongoing use of a State’s
military power as an international counterterrorism tool.27 This is equally
unremarkable for two primary reasons. First, never before had the United
States engaged in an ongoing military campaign of this magnitude and duration against a non–State opponent operating in various locations
throughout the globe. Second, and perhaps more importantly, is the consistent invocation of authority derived from a situation of armed conflict to
provide the legal foundation for these military operations. This has produced a profound expansion of national authority to seek out and incapacitate members of terrorist organizations falling within the scope of what the
United States considers the “enemy”—defined by the authority to kill as a
measure of first resort and subject captives to long–term preventive detention.28
When the Bush administration originally coined the phrase “Global
War on Terror” (GWOT), it was intended to put the terrorist enemy on
notice that no longer were they functionally immune from the powerful
U.S. combat arsenal. However, it also unleashed a decade long barrage of
26. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Statement to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (Dec. 8, 2003), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911
/hearings/hearing6/witness_schulhofer.htm.
27. Jules Lobel, The Preventive Paradigm and the Perils of Ad Hoc Balancing, 91 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 1407, 1407–8 (2007); Monbiot, supra note 17.
28. Corn & Jensen, supra note 16, at 45–46; John Brennan, Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Program on Law and Security Harvard Law School: Strengthening Our Security by Adhering to Our Values (Sept.
16, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-obrennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an [hereinafter Brennan Speech];
Eric H. Holder Jr., Department of Justice Attorney General, Northwestern University
School of Law, Speech on Targeted Killing (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/iso/
opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html.
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controversy, driven in large measure by the suggestion that this new “war”
lacked any geographical limitation. Unlike wars of the recent past, all of
which were conducted within a de facto geographically confined battlespace,
the United States would, according to this new theory, take the fight to the
enemy—an enemy so unconventional that this might include locations
without even the slightest link to a theater of “active” combat operations,
areas commonly characterized as “hot zones” today. Although President
Obama abandoned the GWOT moniker, his administration nonetheless
continues to strike targets of opportunity when and where they emerge,
embracing the same threat–based scope of combat operations.29
In practice, these operations have never come close to matching the extreme rhetoric of power assertion invoked by opponents of the armed conflict with al Qaeda. The United States has never engaged in a cavalier assertion of combat power into the territory of a functioning State.30 Opponents
to the GWOT concept like to erect the straw man of a U.S. attack in the
streets of Berlin, London, Paris or Zurich to demonstrate the consequences
of a geographically unconstrained armed conflict against an unconventional
terrorist enemy. In reality, however, the actual scope of combat operations
has always been much more constrained by the (at least implicit) recognition of sovereignty.
Nonetheless, the concept of armed conflict of international scope conducted against a loosely organized non–State opponent—a typology of
armed conflict resulting in the increasingly common characterization of
“transnational armed conflict,”—certainly creates the perception, if not the
reality, of authority overreach. The central theme of this theory is that the
nature of the struggle justifies invoking and applying LOAC–based authorities, while at the same time the dispersed and unconventional nature of the
“enemy” necessitates taking the fight to where the attack opportunity arises.
It cannot, however, be disputed that TAC represents a major shift in
the conventional understanding of armed conflict typology.31 Prior to Sep29. Laurie R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33 UNIPENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 675, 675–76 (2012) (“In
2010, the United States launched 118 drone strikes in Pakistan, an exponential increase
over past years. In a broader view, in 2009, the U.S. Army reported a 400% increase in
drone flight hours over the previous ten years. Drones are regularly used in combat operations in Afghanistan and Libya, and have been used to launch targeted killings in Somalia
and Yemen.”).
30. Deeks, supra note 18.
31. Vité, supra note 4.
VERSITY OF
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tember 11, these conflicts were almost always confined geographically,
rarely if ever raising the question of their legitimacy.32 When they spilled
into the territory of neighboring States, no significant debate was ever generated over the legally permissible “zone” of operations. This is no longer
the case. Instead, primarily as the result of U.S. military operations against
al Qaeda, there is an increasing tendency to assert that even if it is possible
for the United States to be engaged in an armed conflict against this terrorist enemy, that conflict must be confined to “hot zones” of combat, most
notably Afghanistan.33 This assertion, however, fails to recognize the strategic imperative that drove the development of this TAC typology. It was
precisely the need to take this fight to the unconventional enemy—
wherever the threat arose—that generated the assertion of an internationalized non–international armed conflict.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TERRORIST THREAT,
TRANSNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT AND GEOGRAPHY OF WAR
Prior to September 11 and the advent of TAC, there was virtually no discourse on the permissible geographic scope of armed conflict. This is unsurprising, considering almost all armed conflicts of this period were internal, or relatively confined inter–State conflicts.34 Even when internal armed
conflicts “spilled over” into neighboring territories, no State asserted the
authority to conduct “global” operations against the non–State insurgent
enemy. Use of the term “Global War on Terror” fundamentally altered the
existing paradigm. Suddenly, a State was invoking the authority to engage
what it determined were belligerent operatives wherever the opportunity to
do so arose. U.S. global reach and dominant combat capability made it
clear that this new enemy could not afford the risk of “basing” operations
out of operational clusters confined to one geographic area. Because dispersion had to, by necessity, become the modus operandi of this new enemy,35
32. Id.; Corn, supra note 7.
33. Mary Ellen O’Connell, The Myth of Pre-emptive Self-Defense, ASIL Task Force on
Terrorism (Aug. 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf [hereinafter O’Connell].
34. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, Invoking the Rule of Law: International Discourses, in CIVIL
WAR AND THE RULE OF LAW 48–53 (Agnes Hurwitz & Reyko Huang eds., 2008).
35. Manuel Almeida, What’s New in Al-Qaeda’s Suicide Bombings?, THE MAJALLA: THE
LEADING ARAB MAGAZINE (Jun. 17, 2010), available at http://www.majalla.com/eng/
2010/06/article5567539.
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it inherently drove operations to extend beyond the “hot zone” of Afghanistan.36
Of course, it also fueled criticism of the armed conflict characterization. Critics, relying on the “organization” and “intensity” test for assessing
the existence of non–international armed conflict adopted in the Tadic appeals judgment by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, insisted that TAC was a legal nullity.37 In contrast, the United
States has adopted more of a totality–of–the–circumstances approach to
assess the existence of armed conflict, relying on the intense risk presented
by al Qaeda and that organization’s objective of inflicting harm on the
United States and its interests wherever and whenever possible to offset
the organization element of the Tadic test.38 Such an approach is justified
when the effectiveness of operations against an opponent disables the ability of that opponent to manifest traditional organizational characteristics.
Indeed, proponents of TAC (a typology of armed conflict frequently associated with this author) implicitly understand that a strict two–prong test
for assessing armed conflict produces a perverse windfall for the transnational terrorist enemy: as their operations become more unconventional
and dispersed, the authority of the State to press the attack dissipates. Recent speeches by Obama administration officials seem to indicate that the
assessed risk of future terrorist attacks is driving the decision to mount unrelenting pressure on al Qaeda.39 Depriving the State of legal freedom of
maneuver to press the advantage against a degraded non–State enemy is
ultimately inconsistent with its strategic and operational imperative. At a
minimum, it raises the complex issue of assessing the point at which a
non–international armed conflict recedes back into a category of non–
conflict and nullifies LOAC applicability—an issue lacking clear and consistent standards.40
36. President Barack Obama, supra note 24.
37. Vité, supra note 4.
38. Brennan Speech, supra note 28 (“This Administration’s counterterrorism efforts
outside of Afghanistan and Iraq are focused on those individuals who are a threat to the
United States, whose removal would cause a significant—even if only temporary—
disruption of the plans and capabilities of al-Qa’ida and its associated forces.”); see also
Laurie Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: Syria, Law and the Imperatives
of Conflict Recognition, 46 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW __ (forthcoming, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2029989.
39. Brennan Speech, supra note 28.
40. Vité, supra note 4 (discussing the lack of standards defining when a noninternational armed conflict recedes back into a category of non-conflict).
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Where the United States presses this advantage has been and remains
the other major source of consternation with the TAC concept. Critics assert an inherent invalidity to a claim of armed conflict authority that exceeds the geographic bounds of a “hot zone” of operations.41 While tactical
spillover operations into contiguous States may be tolerable in limited circumstances, extending combat operations to the territory of States far removed from a traditional battlespace is condemned as the ultimate manifestation of an overbroad conception of armed conflict. This criticism cuts
to the core of the TAC concept. Expansive geographic scope was the very
genesis of TAC, an invocation of LOAC principles to address a transnational non–State belligerent threat.42 What these criticisms seem to overlook is a critical strategic foundation for TAC itself: the relationship between the scope of counterterror military operations and the evolution of
the TAC concept reveals that like other evolutions of armed conflict typologies, threat dynamics and strategic realities drove the law applicability assessment, and not vice versa.
The U.S. response to the September 11 terrorist attacks indicated the
intent to leverage military power to maximum effect whenever and wherever the opportunity arose.43 Employing combat power in a manner indicative of armed conflict—by targeting terrorist operatives as a measure of
first resort—would not be the exclusive modality to achieve this objective.
However, unlike previous counterterror efforts it did become a significant,
and in many cases primary, modality. Of course, selecting between military
force and other capabilities involved a complex assessment of a variety of
considerations, including the feasibility of alternate means to disable the
threat—a classic illustration of national security policy making. What was
clear, however, was that the nature of the threat drove a major shift in the
response modality.
While the TAC typology seemed to defy accepted international law categorizations of armed conflict, it was never really remarkable. National security strategy is always threat driven: intelligence defines the risk created
by various threats; and strategy is developed to prioritize national effort to
protect the nation from these threats, including defining the tools of national power that will be leveraged to achieve this objective. When national
41. O’Connell, supra note 33; Daskal, supra note 17, at 32–33.
42. See Corn & Jensen, supra note 16.
43. Philip Alston, Jason Morgan-Foster & William Abresch, The Competence of the UN
Human Rights Council and its Special Procedures in Relation to Armed Conflicts: Extrajudicial Executions in the ‘War on Terror’, 19 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (2008).
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security policy makers determine that military power must be used as one
of these tools, this is translated into a military mission. That mission is then
refined in the form of military strategy, which seeks to identify threat vulnerabilities and match combat capabilities to address them.44 Once again,
the nature of the threat becomes the dominant driving force in this strategic analysis. Thus, when the threat capability and/or vulnerability is identified outside a “hot zone,” it in no way nullifies the imperative of addressing
the threat. In short, as others have noted, once the armed conflict door is
open, threat–based strategy—focusing military action in response to threat
dynamics in order to destroy or disable threat capabilities—is essentially
opportunity driven: the conflict follows the belligerent target.45
In conventional inter–State armed conflict, this process is almost axiomatic. One need only consider events such as the sinking of the Bismarck in
the South Atlantic during the opening phase of World War II46 or the
“small war” in East Africa between Great Britain and Germany during
World War I.47 These episodes, like countless others throughout history,
indicate that the scope of armed conflict is threat driven. But the more unconventional the threat becomes, the less comfortable this concept feels.
When non–international armed conflicts were almost exclusively internal in
nature, this produced very little concern. It is a mistake, however, to assume this was the result of some inherent international legal invalidity of
extending such conflicts beyond the territory of one State or perhaps the
border regions of geographically contiguous States. Instead, like all armed
conflicts, it was the combined impact of threat dynamics and diplomatic
and policy considerations that drove the natural geographic constraint associated with internal armed conflicts. Indeed, examples of cross–border
spillover operations bolster this conclusion. From Vietnam, to Turkey, to
South Africa, to Angola, to Rwanda, to Afghanistan, when States perceived
the strategic necessity of expanding an internal armed conflict into the ter44. Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats (Mar. 23, 2012), available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_01.pdf (“Development of the area air
defense plan and planning the defensive counter air operations involves integrating friendly force capabilities and limitations against adversary vulnerabilities to achieve optimum
results in a dynamic tactical environment.”).
45. Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law (May 11,
2009), available at http://opiniojuris.org/2009/06/06/targeted-killing-in-us-counterterror
ism-strategy-and-law/.
46. See Ward Carr, Surviving the Bismarck’s Sinking, 20 NAVAL HISTORY 54 (2006).
47. See EDWARD PAICE, WORLD WAR I: THE AFRICAN FRONT: AN IMPERIAL WAR
ON THE DARK CONTINENT 1–3 (2008).
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ritory of a neighboring State based on the threat dynamics, they have always done so.48
History demonstrates that the scope of armed conflict—whether international or non–international—is threat driven. Strategic reality indicates
that States engaged in armed conflict will, and in fact often must, “take the
fight to the enemy.” But this does not mean that other considerations,
principally diplomatic and political, are not also relevant to the actual scope
of military operations associated with an armed conflict. Like so many other aspects of international law, authority rarely imposes obligation, and
States take into account a variety of diplomatic, military and policy considerations when choosing when and where to assert combat power against an
enemy. One element in this equation is always the tactical, operational and
strategic value of attacking a particular lawful target. This value assessment
must be balanced against second and third–order negative consequences of
exercising attack authority. In the “hot zone” context, this analysis is central to the tactical and operational targeting process, where commanders
routinely refrain from attacking a lawful target because they conclude doing
so will not be worth the costs attendant in attack.49 At the strategic level,
when the target is identified outside the “hot zone,” diplomatic consequences of asserting military power in the territory of another State must
be included among these “costs.” Because such costs are so significant,
States often refrain from exercising this authority.
In the international armed conflict context, the law of neutrality provides an effective framework for assessing when such military action is lawful.50 Neutrality law also provides belligerent States with the legal leverage
to demand neutral States refrain from conduct that would trigger the need
for such military action.51 Unfortunately, the principles established by the
law of neutrality are inapposite to TAC. Indeed, TAC is in many ways sui
generis, as it involves a military response to highly dispersed enemy capabilities and fleeting windows of opportunity to target those capabilities. Thus,
the value of attacking such targets in TAC has obviously been perceived as
48. Vité, supra note 4.
49. International Security Assistance Force–Kabul, Afghanistan, Tactical Directive
(July 6, 2009), available at http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/official_texts/Tactical_Directive
_090706.pdf; Marybeth P. Ulrich, The General Stanley McChrystal Affair: A Case Study in CivilMilitary Relations, 41 PARAMETERS: U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE 86, 93 (2011) (discussing
General McChrystal’s decision to limit attack authority).
50. The Law of Armed Conflict Neutrality, supra note 21.
51. Id.
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far more significant than attacking enemy targets outside “hot zones” of
conflict in the context of more conventional inter–State or intra–State
armed conflicts.
Consequently, the geographic scope of operations associated with TAC
presents unique challenges (if not dilemmas). Unlike the accepted typology
of international conflicts—inter–State armed hostilities—the geographic
scope of TAC is not framed by the complementary international legal principles of neutrality. However, unlike the accepted non–international conflict typology—internal armed hostilities—the enemy center of gravity
and/or attacks that will produce decisive effect will often be located in areas far removed from “hot zones”. Understanding this dynamic is critical to
assessing the validity or wisdom of imposing a geographic “box” on permissible TAC scope. Operational range is not an arbitrary element of
LOAC regulation. It is, instead, a logical consequence of the nature of the
conflicts themselves: in the more conventional context—be it international
or non–international armed conflict—the enemy center of gravity is rarely
dispersed beyond the hot zone of conflict. In contrast, the enemy in TAC
deliberately avoids consolidating its center of gravity in such zones, but instead operates out of whatever safe haven offers the best opportunity for
protection from the reach of State military capabilities.52
This does not mean that the uncertainties created by the intersection of
threat–based scope and TAC are insignificant. To the contrary, extending
the concept of armed conflict to a transnational non–State opponent has
resulted in significant discomfort related to the assertion of State military
power. But attempting to decouple the permissible geography of armed
conflict from threat–driven strategy by imposing some arbitrary legal limit
on the geographic scope of TAC is an unrealistic and ultimately futile endeavor. Other solutions to these uncertainties must be pursued—solutions
that mitigate the perceived overbreadth of authority associated with TAC.
As explained below, these solutions should focus on four considerations:
(1) managing application of the inherent right of self–defense when it results in action within the sovereign territory of a non–consenting State;
(2) adjusting the traditional targeting methodology to account for the increased uncertainties associated with TAC threat identification;

52. See National Security Strategy, supra note 25.
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(3) considering the feasibility of a “functional hors de combat” test to account
for incapacitating enemy belligerents incapable of offering hostile resistance; and
(4) continuing to enhance the process for ensuring that preventive detention of captured belligerent operatives does not become unjustifiably
protracted in duration.
This essay does not seek to develop each of these mitigation measures
in depth. Instead, it proposes that focusing on these (and perhaps other
innovations in existing legal norms) is a more rational approach to mitigating the impact of TAC than imposing an arbitrary geographic scope limitation. Other scholars have already begun to examine some of these concepts, a process that will undoubtedly continue in the future. Whether
these innovations take the form of law or policy is another complex question, which should be the focus of exploration and debate. In short, rejecting the search for geographic limits on the scope of TAC should not be
equated with ignorance of the risks attendant with this broad conception of
armed conflict. Instead, it must be based on the premise that even if such a
limit were proposed, it would ultimately prove ineffective in preventing the
conduct of operations against transnational non–State threats where the
State concludes such operations will produce a decisive effect. Instead, focusing on the underlying issues themselves and considering how the law
might be adjusted to account for actual or perceived authority overbreadth
is a more pragmatic response to these concerns.
A. Jus ad Bellum and the Authority to Take the Fight to the Enemy
One example of proposals to mitigate the risk of overbreadth associated
with TAC is the “unable or unwilling” test highlighted by the scholarship
of Professor Ashley Deeks.53 Deeks proposes a methodology for balancing
a State’s inherent right to defend itself against transnational non–State
threats and the sovereignty of other States where threat operatives are located. Because the law of neutrality cannot provide the framework for balancing these interests (as it does in the context of international armed conflicts), Deeks acknowledges that some other framework is necessary to limit resort to military force outside “hot zones,” even when justified as a
measure of national self–defense. The test she proposes seeks to limit self–
53. See Deeks, supra note 18.
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help uses of military force to situations of absolute necessity by imposing a
set of conditions that must be satisfied to provide some objective assurance
that the intrusion into another State’s territory is a genuine measure of last
resort.54 This is pure lex lata,55 so is Deeks, to an extent. However, Deeks,
having served in the Department of State Legal Advisor’s Office, recognizes that if TAC is a reality (which it is for the United States), these innovations are necessary to ensure it does not result in unjustifiably overbroad
U.S. military action.
B. Target Identification and Engagement
This is precisely the approach that should be considered in the jus in bello
branch of conflict regulation to achieve an analogous balance between necessity and risk during the execution of combat operations. Even assuming
the “unable or unwilling” test effectively limits the exercise of national
self–defense in response to transnational terrorism, it in no way mitigates
the risks associated with the application of combat power once an operation is authorized.
The in bello targeting framework is an obvious starting point for this
type of exploration of the concept and its potential adjustment.56 Indeed, it
seems increasingly apparent that while TAC suggests a broad scope of authority to employ combat power in a LOAC framework with no geographic constraint, the consternation generated by this effect is a result of the
uncertainty produced by the complexity of threat recognition. This consternation is most acute in relation to three aspects of action to incapacitate
terrorist belligerent operatives: the relationship between threat recognition
and the authority to kill as a measure of first resort (the difficulty of applying the principle of distinction when confronting irregular enemy belligerent forces); the pragmatic illogic of asserting the right to kill as a measure
of first resort to an individual subject to capture with virtually no risk to
U.S. forces; and the ability to apply this targeting authority against unconventional enemy operatives located outside of “hot zones”.57
54. See id. at 507–8.
55. J. Jeremy Marsh, Lex Lata or Lex Ferenda? Rule 45 of the ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 198 MILITARY LAW REVIEW 116, 121–25 (2008).
56. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (4th ed. 2004); Corn & Jensen, supra note 16.
57. See Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F.
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These concerns flow from the intersection of a battlespace that is functionally unrestricted by geography and the unconventional nature of the
terrorist belligerent operative. The combined effect of these factors is a
target identification paradigm that defies traditional threat recognition
methodologies: no uniform, no established doctrine, no consistent locus of
operations and dispersed capabilities.58 It is certainly true that threat identification challenges are in no way unique to TAC; threat identification has
always been difficult, especially in the context of “traditional” non–
international armed conflicts involving unconventional belligerent opponents. Yet, when this threat recognition uncertainty was confined to the
geography of one State, it was never perceived to be as problematic as it is
in the context of TAC. This is perplexing. In both contexts, the unconventional nature of the enemy increases the risk of mistake in the target selection and engagement process.59 Thus, employing the same approach is
completely logical.
Two factors appear to provide an explanation for the increased concern over the threat identification uncertainty in the context of TAC. One
of these is beyond the scope of “mitigation solutions,” while the other is
not. The first is the increased public awareness and interest in both the legal authority to use military force and the legality of the conduct of hostilities, a factor that inevitably increases the scrutiny on military power under
the rubric of TAC. This pervasive and intense interest in and legal critique
of military operations associated with what is euphemistically called the war
on terror is truly unprecedented. In this “lawfare” environment, it is unsurprising that government action that deprives individuals of life as a measure
of first resort or subjects them to preventive detention that may last a lifetime—often impacting individuals located far beyond a “hot zone” of
armed hostilities—generates intense legal scrutiny.60 This factor, whether a

Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (No. 10-cv-01469); Daskal, supra note 17; Pakistan Unrelenting in
Demanding Drone Strike End, CBS NEWS (July 30, 2012), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301501363_162-57482623/pakistan-unrelenting-in-demanding-drone-strike-end/.
58. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing the
LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEXAS INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL 337 (2012)
[hereinafter Corn & Corn]; Geoffrey S. Corn, Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed
Quantum of Information Component, 77 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW 437 (2012).
59. Corn, supra note 7.
60. The ACLU drone litigation is the first lawsuit in modern history challenging legal
authority for wartime targeting. See ACLU v. DOJ, No. 10-436, 2011 WL 4005324
(D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2011).
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net positive or negative, is a reality that is unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future.
The second factor—a factor that is amenable to adjustments in legal
authorities to ameliorate the perceived overbreadth of TAC—is the perception that this risk of targeting error when attacking unconventional forces
increases proportionally with the attenuation from a “hot zone” of operations.61 Whether there is any empirical foundation for this perception is
uncertain, nor is it clear that the assumption itself is valid. However, in
many ways perception has become reality.
In an article published in the Brooklyn Law Review, I proposed a sliding
quantum of information related to the assessment of targeting legality
based on relative proximity to a “hot zone.”62 In essence, I proposed that
when conducting operations against unconventional non–State operatives,
the reasonableness of a target legality judgment requires increased informational certainty the more attenuated the nominated target becomes to a
zone of traditional combat operations. The concept was proposed as a
measure to mitigate the increased risk of targeting error when engaging an
unconventional belligerent operative in an area that itself does not indicate
belligerent activity. Jennifer Daskal offers a similar proposal in her article,
The Geography of the Battlefield.63 Daskal presents a more comprehensive approach to adjusting the traditional targeting framework when applied to the
TAC context. Both of these articles seek to mitigate the consequence of
applying broad LOAC authority against a dispersed and unconventional
enemy; both methods that should continue to be explored.
C. The Capture or Kill Dilemma?
One of the issues Daskal addresses in her article beyond that of target identification is the legitimacy of applying the authority to kill as a measure of
first resort to enemy belligerents outside “hot zones” of hostilities. 64 This
issue is obviously a focal point of the contemporary debate over the use of
unmanned aerial systems (armed drones) to attack belligerent operatives. It
61. This is the foundation for Daskal’s hot zone article. See Daskal, supra note 17.
62. Targeting, Command Judgment, and a Proposed Quantum of Information Component, supra
note 58, at 460–94 (“The greater the presumption that a potential object of attack is not a
legal military objective, the greater the quantum of information necessary to justify attacking the target.”).
63. See Daskal, supra note 17.
64. Id.
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is also at the center of the debate related to the authority to engage civilians
taking a direct part in hostilities.65 What Daskal proposes, which is analogous to the ICRC DPH Interpretive Guidance,66 is that capture (rather than
kill) should be obligatory when it is a feasible alternative to employing
deadly force.67
No single aspect of the DPH Interpretive Guidance generated more controversy than Section IX of the study, which asserted an identical obligation to capture instead of kill civilians engaged in DPH whenever feasible.68
In support of this assertion, the study relies on an article published by Jean
Pictet (the well–known author of the ICRC commentaries to the 1949 Geneva Conventions) in which he asserts that the principle of humanity obligates belligerents to refrain from using deadly force against enemy belligerents when capture is a “risk free” alternative.69 Many LOAC experts, including this author, contest this interpretation of the law, arguing instead

65. NILS MELZER, INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (May 2009) (prepared by Nils Melzer) [hereinafter ICRC
DPH Interpretive Guidance], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc002-0990.pdf (“[T]he kind and degree of force which is permissible against persons not
entitled to protection against direct attack must not exceed what is actually necessary to
accomplish a legitimate military purpose in the prevailing circumstances.”); see W. Hays
Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise,
and Legally Incorrect, 42 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS 769 (2010) (responding to the new guidance).
66. ICRC DPH Interpretative Guidance, supra note 65.
67. See Daskal, supra note 17.
68. See ICRC DPH Interpretive Guidance, supra note 65.
69. As found in Parks, supra note 65, at 785–87. According to footnote 221 of the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law,
It is in this sense that Pictet’s famous statement should be understood that “[i]f we can
put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should not wound him; if we can obtain
the same result by wounding him, we must not kill him. If there are two means to achieve
the same military advantage, we must choose the one which causes the lesser evil”. See
Pictet, Development and Principles of International Humanitarian Law (Dordrecht,
Nijhoff 1985), pp. 75 f. During the expert meetings, it was generally recognized that the
approach proposed by Pictet is unlikely to be operable in classic battlefield situations involving large-scale confrontations (Report DPH 2006, pp. 75 f., 78) and that armed forces
operating in situations of armed conflict, even if equipped with sophisticated weaponry
and means of observation, may not always have the means or the opportunity to capture
rather than kill (Report DPH 2006, p. 63).

See ICRC DPH Interpretive Guidance, supra note 65, at 82 n.221.
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that unless and until the enemy belligerent becomes hors de combat, the law
permits the application of deadly force as a measure of first resort.70
There is, however, a common thread that runs through the ICRC DPH
Interpretive Guidance, precursors to the Interpretive Guidance (most significantly
the Israeli High Court of Justice decision on targeted killings),71 Daskal’s
proposal, and Pictet’s interpretation of the principle of humanity: the obvious discomfort with a legal norm that permits the killing of a human being
when capture provides a risk–free alternative for achieving the goal of incapacitation. In my article Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades,72 I attempt to
explain why this apparent overbreadth of deadly force authority is an unfortunate yet necessary aspect of armed hostilities, and I remain unpersuaded that the law imposes an implicit limitation of the authority to use
deadly force based on the unconventional nature of the belligerent opponent or the opponent’s geographic location.
While a capture–instead–of–kill obligation remains a controversial assertion, what is undisputed is that LOAC prohibits deliberate attacks on
any person not actively participating in hostilities, whether a civilian who
has directly participated in hostilities or a belligerent who is hors de combat.
Traditionally, an enemy belligerent is rendered hors de combat only as the result of wounds, sickness or surrender. The normal application of this
LOAC principle permits attack on enemy belligerent operatives—members
of organized belligerent groups engaged in hostilities—regardless of their
location, or the ease with which they might be captured, so long as they are
still “combat effective,” even when they pose no immediate or apparent
threat.73 This seemingly harsh outcome is justified by a number of considerations. It is ultimately based on the presumption that a fully functional
member of an enemy belligerent group represents an ongoing threat, and
attacking that individual is linked to bringing about the submission of the
group writ large.74
This explains why many LOAC experts reject the suggestion that an
enemy belligerent operative is somehow immune from attack as the result
70. ICRC DPH Interpretive Guidance, supra note 65; Geoffrey S. Corn, Mixing Apples
and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limits of Applying Human Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUDIES 52 (2010).
71. See Parks, supra note 65, at 788–93.
72. See Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades, supra note 70.
73. See Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 JOURNAL OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 115 (2010) (noting how the harshness of this rule has led some to question its continuing validity) [hereinafter Blum].
74. See Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades, supra note 70; Parks, supra note 65.
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of being in a location where he can be safely captured. However, the combined effect of being in such a location—especially a location distant from
any ongoing active combat operations—with the conclusion that the operative is unarmed and functionally inoffensive (for example, an unarmed al
Qaeda operative exiting a commercial airliner at a U.S. airport while under
close observation by government agents) explains why this assertion of kill
authority is criticized as unjustifiably over–broad.
The debate is symbolic of the overall challenge to the current response
to transnational terrorism through the armed conflict modality: it reveals an
effort to push a square peg into a round hole. It is clear that the “kill authority” analytical methodology is derived from a predominantly conventional conflict context. In that context, the balance of interests justifies the
at times over–broad application of deadly combat power, and altering this
equation produces an unjustified shift of risk to attacking forces (a point I
attempted to explain in Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades).75 Perhaps, however, the context of geographically dispersed combat operations within the
framework of TAC warrants consideration of imposing a policy–based
constraint on this authority, what might be characterized as a functional
hors de combat test. Such a test would limit “kill authority” when tactical assessment indicates that capture is completely feasible without subjecting
friendly forces to risk, and the object of capture is attenuated from both an
area of active combat operations and other belligerent operatives.
Ironically, when Professor Gabrielle Blum proposed such a limitation
in her article The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers,76 I was quite skeptical. However, my skepticism focused primarily on two considerations. First, her proposal extended to “hot zones”. I remain opposed to such an extension, as I
believe it would inject a dangerous dilution of tactical initiative into the execution of combat operations.77 Second, it was unclear whether Professor
Blum was proposing a legal norm, or a policy constraint on permissible
legal authority. Once it was clear that we shared opposition to modifying
the existing legal authority to attack even an inoffensive enemy belligerent
operative (such as an enemy soldier sleeping in a barracks or assembly area
or attempting to retreat from an ongoing attack), and that she was in fact

75. Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades, supra note 70, at 84–90.
76. Blum, supra note 73.
77. See Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades, supra note 70.
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proposing consideration of policy limits on that authority, we were much
more closely aligned in our views.78
This latter aspect of the “capture or kill” debate is critical, and in my
opinion, if such a limitation on targeting authority is justified, it must be
framed as a policy limit on otherwise lawful authority: a rule of engagement.79 This is because there may be situations, even where these conditions are satisfied, when an attack is justified because of the influence it will
produce on enemy leadership and other belligerent operatives. It is this
corporate, as opposed to individualized, approach to attack justification
that distinguishes targeting belligerent operatives from targeting civilians
taking a direct part in hostilities. It therefore requires strictly limiting any
“capture or kill” obligation to a policy applique restricting underlying legal
authority. In short, even when capture is a completely feasible option to
incapacitate an enemy belligerent operative, there still are times when attack
is preferred because of the shock effect it will produce on the corporate
enemy capability.80
Such a policy may also be a useful method to alleviate the uncertainties
associated with the intersection of belligerent detention authority and belligerent targeting authority. The complexity of this connection seems to
have been highlighted by Justice Kennedy early in our TAC with al Qaeda,
when he challenged the government to articulate a unified theory of detention/attack authority in the Padilla oral arguments.81 In response to the
government’s assertion that Padilla’s status as an enemy belligerent justified
his LOAC–based preventive detention, Justice Kennedy asked a question
that the government never answered: would that same status justify killing
Padilla as he walked off the plane at Chicago O’Hare Airport?
QUESTION: Would you shoot him when he got off the plane?
MR. CLEMENT: No, I don't think we could for good and sufficient reasons –
78. Gabriella Blum, Address Before the American Society of International Law, Mind
the Gap: International Human Rights Law and the Law of Armed Conflict (Jan. 25, 2010),
audio recording available at http://www.asil.org/files/100125mindthegap.mp3.
79. See Corn & Corn, supra note 58, at 353–57.
80. Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades, supra note 70, at 80 (“attacking the enemy with
deadly combat power is customarily considered necessary to force an opponent into submission.”)
81. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No.
03-1027).
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QUESTION: I assume that you could shoot someone that you had captured on the field of battle.82

The Solicitor General offered a false analogy in response to this question,
asserting that once an individual is captured the authority to kill dissipates.
This is simply an application of the hors de combat rule, and is unremarkable.
However, what the question really exposed was whether the authority to
kill—an authority triggered by enemy belligerent status—applied prior to
capture where capture was a completely feasible course of action. That
question remains relevant, and by subjecting kill authority to a policy–based
constraint it will perhaps strike a more effective balance between necessity
and humanity and contribute to a logical synchronization between the exercise of detention and targeting authority for individuals captured in situations similar to those of Padilla. (Interestingly, the Solicitor General ultimately relied on rules of engagement to complete his response to the question: “And I think in every case, there are rules of engagement, there are
rules for the appropriate force that should be used. And I don't know that
there are any.”)83
This “functional hors de combat” concept and accordant policy limitation
on the use of deadly force as a first resort is something I have only begun
to consider. However, it seems clear that addressing the perceived overbreadth of “kill authority” within the context of TAC is an important endeavor that may effectively respond to arguments claiming that the TAC
concept is illegitimate. Developing a rational methodology to assess when
the kill option is justified, or when capture should be attempted as a condition precedent—even if only in the form of policy—would be a potentially
valuable advancement in the complex equation of unconventional enemy
belligerent targeting.
D. Long–Term Preventive Detention
Capture, of course, produces its own complex issues of perceived
ovebreadth, all flowing from subjecting captives to LOAC–based preventive detention. Debates over the legitimacy of designating terrorist operatives as enemy belligerents and subjecting them to LOAC detention principles has raged since the first detainees were transferred to Guantanamo
82. Id.
83. Id.
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Bay, Cuba, in 2001.84 While far from a consensus view, for the purposes of
U.S. practice, this legitimacy issue has been resolved in favor of the authority to detain individuals based on a determination of status as an enemy
belligerent (although how that determination is made, both substantively
and procedurally, is an area of U.S. practice that continues to evolve).85 Detention review procedures have been another source of controversy, and
have developed substantially since the inception of the belligerent detentions.86 As long as debates continue in full force over the credibility of the
procedures adopted for assessing or revalidating enemy belligerent classifications and the judicial review of these decisions, it is unlikely these current
procedures will undergo further substantial modification. Instead, it seems
relatively clear that the government has reached the point where it believes
these procedures are both operationally effective and legally defensible—an
inference bolstered by the overall record of government success in the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Two issues, however, should be subjected
to more intense development: who should represent detainees in the status
determination process, and how to determine when preventive detention
should terminate.
From the inception of the unprivileged detention operation, the United
States has chosen not to provide suspected enemy belligerents with assistance of legal counsel.87 Instead, the review process implemented to assess
this status—both at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan—has relied on lay
military officers to assist detainees through the proceedings.88 This practice
is apparently the result of analogy to the process established in Article 5 of

84. Chris Jenks & Eric T. Jensen, Indefinite Detention Under the Laws of War, 22 STANLAW AND POLICY REVIEW 41, 51–55 (2011) (“[T]he deconstructionist approach
removes a large portion of internationally recognized and accepted provisions for regulating detention associated with armed conflict—the Geneva Conventions—while leaving
the underlying question of how to govern detention unanswered.”)
85. Id.
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2012); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13277 (Mar. 7,
2011); Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, THE ARMY LAWYER (DA PAM 27-50-445) (June 2010).
87. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUMBIA LAW
REVIEW 1013, 1037–38 (“[T]he legality of... military detention and interrogation without
access to counsel remains unresolved.”).
88. See memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Def., Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004), available at http://www.defens
elink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
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the Third Geneva Convention for resolving doubt as to whether captives
qualify for prisoner of war status.89
In a recently published article, Unprivileged Belligerents,90 I challenge the
underlying rationale for this lay assistance model. Specifically, I argue that
the stakes involved in these review proceedings and the inherent complexity of granting status to non–State belligerent actors—a difficulty caused by
the need to rely on pre–capture conduct and affiliation as opposed to the
much easier reliance on uniform or other formal belligerent identification
indicators—justifies assistance of legal officers. While I acknowledge that
lay officers are certainly capable of learning the procedures applicable to
these review proceedings, I question whether non–lawyers can effectively
represent the interests of suspected enemy operatives. In contrast, I assert
that the ethos of zealous representation—a core ethical norm of the legal
profession—will enhance the quality and legitimacy of the detainee–status–
determination process.
This lay–representation paradigm has finally been called into question.
The extremely controversial provisions of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, authorizing preventive military detention of
U.S. and alien terrorist operatives, include, for the first time, a mandate to
provide detainees with legal representation during detention review proceedings.91 The statute, signed into law by President Obama on December
19, 2011, provides that the Secretary of Defense must submit to Congress
within ninety days of enactment a report “setting forth the procedures for
determining the status of persons captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–
40) for purposes of section 1021.”92 The law then provides, inter alia, that
89. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 1355, art. 5 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III].
90. Geoffrey S. Corn & Peter A. Chickris, Unprivileged Belligerents, Preventive Detention,
and Fundamental Fairness: Rethinking the Review Tribunal Representation Model, SANTA CLARA
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 115 (2012).
91. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Public Law No. 112-81
§ 1024(a), 125 Stat. 1298, 1565 (2011).
92. Section 1021 “affirms that the authority of the President to use all necessary and
appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military Force . . . includes the
authority. . . to detain covered persons. . . pending disposition under the law of war.” Id. §
1021(a). Persons who may be detained under section 1021 include persons “who planned,
authorized, committed, or aided . . . or harbored those responsible” for the attacks occurring on September 11, 2001 as well as persons who were
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“an unprivileged enemy belligerent may, at the election of the belligerent,
be represented by military counsel at proceedings for the determination of
status of the belligerent.”93
It is not yet clear at what point in the detention process this assistance
of counsel requirement will become operative. According to the Conference Report on the NDAA:
The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1036) that would require the Secretary of Defense to establish procedures for determining
the status of persons captured in the course of hostilities authorized by
the Authorization for Use of Military Force (Public Law 107–40), including access to a military judge and a military lawyer for an enemy belligerent who will be held in long–term detention. The House bill contained no
similar provision.
The House recedes with an amendment clarifying that the Secretary of
Defense is not required to apply the procedures for long–term detention
in the case of a person for whom habeas corpus review is available in federal court. Because this provision is prospective, the Secretary of Defense
is authorized to determine the extent, if any, to which such procedures
will be applied to detainees for whom status determinations have already
been made prior to the date of the enactment of this Act. The conferees
expect that the procedures issued by the Secretary of Defense will define
what constitutes ‘‘long–term’’ detention for the purposes of subsection
(b). The conferees understand that under current Department of Defense
practice in Afghanistan, a detainee goes before a Detention Review Board
for a status determination 60 days after capture, and again 6 months after
that. The Department of Defense has considered extending the period of
time before a second review is required. The conferees expect that the
procedures required by subsection (b) would not be triggered by the first
review, but could be triggered by the second review, in the discretion of
the Secretary.94

Thus, legal representation will now turn on the definition of “long–term”
detention. Nonetheless, this is an important step forward in the procedural
a part of or substantially supported al–Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of
such enemy forces.

Id. § 1021(b).
93. Id. § 1024(b)(2).
94. H.R. REP. NO. 112-329, pt. 1, at 696–97 (2011).
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protections afforded individuals subjected to wartime preventive detention.
Whatever emerges as the ultimate triggering point, the detention review
process will undoubtedly be enhanced by this provision. While no amount
of process will ameliorate the concerns of critics of the fundamental concept of applying wartime preventive detention to counterterror operations,
even the most ardent of such critics must acknowledge that providing representatives trained in the lawyer ethos of zealous representation is a
marked improvement to the lay representation model utilized prior to the
enactment of the NDAA 2012.
Preventive detention based on a determination of belligerent status, like
targeting based on the same categorization, is central to the entire TAC
concept. The ability to use combat power to kill as a measure of first resort
compared to detention that prevents a return to belligerent activities are the
two most significant authorities triggered by the armed conflict characterization. It is therefore unlikely that the United States will abandon this detention regime, which, as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Boumediene v.
Bush, may continue for an entire generation.95 When the stakes of a factual
determination by a review tribunal—even one not related to punitive sanction—are so obviously profound, it is fair to ask whether reliance on lay
military officers to represent the interests of alleged belligerent operatives
can genuinely be considered legitimate. If legitimacy is defined by a credible
and fair balance between the interests of protecting national security and
the interests inherent in safeguards from arbitrary detention, it seems difficult to ignore the potential value legal assistance might add to the accuracy
of the belligerent status determination.
Once that decision is made, with or without assistance of counsel, the
impact is clear: preventive detention for the duration of hostilities. But this
raises an even more complex and in many ways troubling incongruity between the nature of the ongoing TAC against al Qaeda and the LOAC
principles upon which this detention model is based: when should detention terminate? This question is critically important to the credibility and
legitimacy of asserting LOAC authority to justify detention. The entire unprivileged belligerent detention regime is built on the premise that detention is justified for the duration of hostilities to prevent the belligerent
95. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (extending the constitutional
writ of habeas corpus to unprivileged enemy belligerents detained at Guantanamo Naval
Base based on the conclusion, inter alia, that “the consequence of error may be detention
of persons for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk too
significant to ignore.”).
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from returning to operations.96 This principle derives from LOAC and, in
the context of more conventional armed conflicts, is virtually axiomatic.97
However, it seems equally clear that the principle of incapacitation by detention for the duration of hostilities was not developed in contemplation
of an armed conflict of unlimited duration. This aspect of the current detention regime is exacerbated by the nature of the armed conflict, in which
some type of formal or explicit recognition of hostility termination by the
belligerent parties is virtually inconceivable (this is certainly not the case in
the context of inter–State hostilities, or even intra–State hostilities involving organized armed groups).98
It is therefore unsurprising that one of the most consistent criticisms of
U.S. detention policy has been that it authorizes indefinite detention.99 This
is virtually inconceivable in any other context, regardless of whether the
individual is detained within a punitive or preventive framework. One solution to this issue, of course, is to abandon LOAC–based preventive detention entirely. This, however, is unlikely in the foreseeable future, which
leads some scholars to critique the potential overbreadth of purely status–
based preventive detention—even within a LOAC framework. For example, in their article, Indefinite Detention Under the Laws of War,100 Professors
(and retired military lawyers) Jenks and Jensen assert that what might be
best understood as “conduct–based detention validation” procedures extrapolated from LOAC civilian internment rules would effectively address
the risk of unjustified indefinite detention of unprivileged enemy belligerents.101
An alternate modification is the imposition of presumptive detention
termination dates linked to adjusted burdens that justify continued deten96. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (“We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to
war as to be an exercise of the necessary and appropriate force Congress has authorized
the President to use.”) (internal quotations omitted).
97. See Geneva Convention III, supra note 89.
98. List of Recent Peace Agreements, U.S. INSTITUTE FOR PEACE, http://www.usip
.org/publicationstools/latest?filter1=**ALL**&filter0=**ALL**&filter2=2223&filter3=*
*ALL**&filter4=%20(last%20visited%20Aug.%2014,%202012).
99. See Laurie R. Blank, Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too
Far, 63 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW 1169, 1183–91 (2011) (noting the “inherently punitive”
nature of holding suspected terrorists indefinitely under the guise of prisoners of war).
100. See Jenks & Jensen, supra note 84.
101. Id. at 87–91 (addressing the various ways detention is authorized to end according to LOAC principles).
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tion. Drawing an analogy to procedures for declassification of national security information, this approach would begin by assessing the extreme end
state for prisoners of war detentions since 1949. Such an assessment suggests that almost all such detentions terminated within ten years from inception.102 Thus, for example, a policy might be adopted that would create
a presumptive detention termination date ten years from the date of inception. Like the declassification context, this presumption would not be conclusive. Instead, it would impose on the government a rebuttable burden to
justify continuing preventive detention beyond—or even until—
presumptive termination. Subsequent duration triggers could be adopted
that would increase the burden of proof on the government, leading ultimately to a requirement that the government must justify what would be in
effect “generational” detention by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the detainee is likely to return to belligerent activities.
Perhaps neither of these approaches is ideal, but both share the common goal of aligning long–term preventive detention—what is in effect
indefinite detention—with a legitimate determination of necessity. Like the
other adjustments suggested by this essay, accomplishing this goal will mitigate the actual and perceived overbreadth of asserting LOAC authority
within a TAC framework.
Perhaps other modifications to existing LOAC authorities should also
be explored to achieve this objective. Devoting academic and policy efforts
toward these and other similar authority adjustments will produce a more
positive effect than fishing for the Red Herring of a defined geography of
armed conflict. This is precisely because they will be rooted in both operational logic and humanitarian considerations, thereby increasing the likelihood of being accepted as consistent with strategic imperatives—not as an
arbitrary legal fiction inconsistent with a threat–driven strategic reality.
IV. CONCLUSION
The law of conflict regulation is arguably at a critical crossroads. If threat
drives strategy, and strategy drives the existence of armed conflict, the concept of TAC seems an unavoidable reality in the modern strategic envi102. See Piero Scaruffi, Wars and Genocides of the 20th Century, Scaruffi.com,
http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/massacre.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2012); see also SUSANNE EVERETT, WARS OF THE 20TH CENTURY (1986). See generally List of Wars 1945–
1989, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_wars_1945–1989 (last visited
Aug. 14, 2012).
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ronment. Opponents of TAC will continue to argue for limiting armed
conflict to the well–accepted inter–State or intra–State hostilities frameworks, but this would only drive States to adopt sub rosa uses of the same
type of power under the guise of legal fictions. Concepts such as self–
defense targeting, or internationalized law enforcement, might avoid the
armed conflict characterization, but they would do little to resolve the underlying uncertainties associated with TAC. Even worse, they would inject
regulatory uncertainty into the planning and execution of military counterterror operations, and expose those called upon to put themselves in
harm’s way to protect the State to legal liabilities based on inapposite legal
norms.
If, however, the geographic scope of TAC is accepted as a threat–
driven dynamic, then it seems imperative to consider how the law will respond to the uncertainties created by this reality and addressed in this essay. What conduct results in the designation of belligerent status? Should
there be an individualized, “imminence” assessment associated with targeting suspected belligerent operatives outside a “hot zone” of conflict? How
certain must an operational commander be before reaching this conclusion? Should capture instead of kill be a legal or policy obligation outside
the “hot zone?” Should there be a presumptive termination date for belligerent detention authority, requiring the State to justify continued detention
by some burden sufficiently weighty to protect individuals from arbitrary
indefinite detention?
These are all important and legitimate questions that should be the focus of legal debate and analysis. TAC may provide a framework based on
core LOAC principles within which to assess these questions, but TAC in
no way conclusively resolves them. Instead, it was originally conceived as a
typology of armed conflict that reconciled the denial of privileged belligerent legitimacy for the terrorist enemy with the obligation to respect fundamental LOAC norms in the execution of such operations (to include the
detention and treatment of captured terrorist belligerents), all within the
strategic imperative of robust global counterterror operations. No other
typology fully satisfied these goals—goals that drove the U.S. response to
September 11. The lingering questions associated with this effort to synchronize strategic objectives with legal regulation must be the focal point
of critical analysis regarding the future of irregular warfare.
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